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THE ORIGINAL I HEORY OF MORAL PANICS
Although the argument that media coverage can have an active role in creating deviant behaviour owes its existence to symbolic interactionist theories of 'labelling' (cf. Becker 1963; Wilkins 1964) , it was the pioneering studies of Jock Young (1971) on the social meaning of drugtaking and Stanley Cohen (1972 Cohen ( /1980 ) on the media-inspired confrontations between mods and rockers, and their edited collections (Cohen 1971; Cohen and Young 1973 ) which developed and effectively launched the concept of 'moral panic'. Not only did their studies explore how agents of social control like the police played a role in 'amplifying' deviance, but they developed a vocabulary for understanding the powerful part played by the media. This meant going beyond the sociological accounts which looked at patterns of ownership and control as signs of complicity between media and government. Attention Rethinking 'moral panic' for multi-medzated soctal worlds 561 was now being paid to the ideological role of the media and the active construction of certain kinds of meaning.
In addition, this work explored how deviant behaviour was interactive rather than absolutist. It was more often the outcome of complex chains of social interaction than the product of young people with a predisposition, individually or environmentally, towards crime or rule-breaking behaviour. Finally this approach challenged moral guardians by suggesting that their overreaction was counterproductive. The media coverage of deviance acted as a kind of handbook of possibilities to be picked over by new recruits. Worse still, segregating young people away from the community created a greater risk of long-term social disorder since 'a society can control effectively only those who perceive themselves to be members of it' (Young 1971:39 Cohen's Folk Devils and Moral Panics is rightfully a classic of media sociology, embracing a greater degree of complexity than the many summaries of the work indicate. He acknowledges that social control is uneven and much less mechanistic than the model of deviancy amplification suggests. Indeed one group of respondents (drawn from the non-mod, non-rocker public) criticizes the media for over-reporting the clashes, while others describe how they came down to the beach to have a look at the 'fun'. Cohen has a sophisticated grasp of how these events fed into popular folklore ('Where are the mods and rockers today?' was a question he was repeatedly asked while carrying out his fieldwork) and when the panic had finally run its course and de-amplification had set in, the characters in this drama settled into history as recognizable social types belonging to a particular period, sometimes referred to, even by the agents of social control, with a hint of nostalgia.
HOOLIGANS, HISTORY, AND HEGEMONY
Engaging directly with the law and other rhetoric of Thatcherism in the late 1970s and into the 1 980s, Geoff Pearson's Hooligans: A Hzstory of Respectable Fears ( 1983) focuses on the way moral panics often entail looking back to a 'golden age' where social stability and strong moral discipline acted as a deterrent to delinquency and disorder. However, twenty years previously, the same process could be seen in operation: the 'kids' were seen as unruly and undisciplined, unlike their counterparts of the previous decade. The same anxieties appear with startling regularity; these involve the immorality of young people, the absence of parental control, the problem of too much free time leading to crime, and the threat which deviant behaviour ,ooses to 562 Angela McRobbte and Sarah L. Thornton national identity and labour discipline. Pearson shows how, during the 1940s, there were scares about 'cosh boys' and Blitz kids and how, in the 1930s, there were a string of moral panics about the misuse of leisure time and the decline of the British way of life through the popularity of Hollywood cinema. Pursuing this chain of investigation back through the nineteenth century, Pearson argues that the nature of the complaints and the social response to them provides a normative and consensual language for understanding the turbulence of social change and discontinuity. The value of this historical study is to cast a critical shadow over any claims about the dramatic rise in violent crimes carried out by young people. Instead, it shows how moral panics in society act as a form of ideological cohesion which draws on a complex language of nostalgia. The studies of Cohen, Young and Pearson show moral panics as acting on behalf of the dominant social order. They are a means of orchestrating consent by actively intervening in the space of public opinion and social consciousness through the use of highly emotive and rhetorical language which has the effect of requiring that 'something be done about it'. The argument about deviancy amplification is precisely that where such strategies are indeed followed by social and legislative action, they also reassure the public that there is strong government and strong leadership. It is only with theories of ideology that the idea of the media's moral panics as defining and distorting social issues gives way to a more integrated and connective understanding of the construction of meaning across the whole range of media forms and institutions. Policing t)ze Cnsis ( 1979) by Stuart Hall and his colleagues at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS), University of Birmingham marks a turning point in this respect. They introduced a more Marxist and a more theoretical vocabulary to the terrain, which was more palatable to British sociologists than much of the structuralist and semiological analysis of the mass media which followed it, first, because it drew on the empirical model of the moral panic and, second, because of its concern for history and political culture. As a result, Policing the Crzsis can be seen as bridging the gap between sociology and cultural studies. Policing the Crisu introduced the Gramscian concept of hegemony to analyse the way in which moral panics around mugging and the alleged criminality of young Afro-Caribbean males created the social conditions of consent which were necessary for the construction of a society more focused towards law and order and less inclined to the liberalism and 'permissiveness' of the 1960s. This particular analysis of the moral panic shows it not to be an isolated phenomenon but a connective strategy, part of the practice of hegemony which enlarges the sphere of influence which Gramsci labelled 'civil society'. The moral panic then becomes an envoy for dominant ideology. In the Rethinking 'moral panic' for multi-medzated soczal worlcls 563 language of common sense, it operates as an advance warning system, and as such it progresses from local issues to matters of national importance, from the site of tension and petty anxieties to full-blown social and political crisis. The authors are alert to the complexity of historical and social breakdown which, they claim, can then be managed only through the escalation of the control and coercion. This begs many questions in relation to the scale of social control, but what is particularly important is the recognition that ideology is a suffusive social process, and that it is not a simple question of the distortion of truth, but rather that ideology is a force which works continuously through the mobilization of'common sense'.
Despite Classic moral panic theorists would ignore the daily endorsement (not to say enjoyment) of heterosexuality as an ideological norm and the consequences this has for those who are excluded. Policies and practices which are concerned with 'policing desire' do not, according to Watney, emanate from one or two centralized agencies of social control. They are endemic in media and society, and in this context the moral panic is best seen as a local intensification or 'the site of the current front line' rather than a sudden, unpleasant and unanticipated development (Watney 1987:42) . Watney suggests that our understanding of moral panics might be fruitfully informed by psychological models which seek to understand the ambivalence, excessive interest and even fascination displayed by moral guardians for the objects of their distaste.
Through considering the meanings which have developed around AIDS and homosexuality, Watney replaces the vocabulary of the moral panic with that of representation, discourse and the 'other'. In so doing, he is able to bring to his work concepts drawn from fields of psychoanalysis, film studies and cultural studies to produce a deeper account of processes of exclusion and regulation than that available in the traditional sociology of social control.
CONTESTI NG 'SOCI ETY' AN D ' H EGE MONY'
British society and media, youth culture and 'deviance' have changed considerably since the 1960s, and these historical transformations bring to light some of the theoretical and methodological limits of these various studies. In original moral panic theory, 'society' and 'societal reactions' were monolithic and, as others have already argued, ultimately functionalist. Similarly, Hall et al., Pearson and Watney perhaps over-state hegemony and overlook the counterdiscourses from which they draw and to which they contribute. In the 1990s, when social differentiation and audience segmentation are the order of the day, we need take account of a plurality of reactions, each with their different constituencies, effectivities and modes of discourse.
Given the kinds of moral panic to which they attend, it is problematic that Cohen's 'society', Pearson . In September 1988, during the 'silly season', the tabloids finally took the bait and subjected the culture to the full front-page treatment. The government, Labour opposition and the police were keen to ignore the topic for as long as they possibly could, only belatedly making statements, arrests and recommending legislation. This moral panic was incited by a couple of culture industries (e.g. recording and magazine publishing) well versed in the 'hip' ideologies of youth subsultures. In addition to the difficulty we have in excluding rather large social groups and industrial activities from accounts of 'society' or 'consensus', so we can't ignore the many voices which now contribute to the debate during moral panics. In the 1990s, interest groups, pressure groups, lobbies and campaigning experts are mobilized to intervene in moral panics. For example, the spokeswoman of the National Council for One Parent Families, Sue Slipman, played a leading role, on an almost weekly basis over a period of three or six months, in diminishing the demonization by the Tories of young single mothers for having children without being married. One of the main aims of pressure groups is timely intervention in relevant moral panics -to be able to respond instantly to the media demonization of the group they represent, and to provide information and analysis designed to counter this representation. The effectiveness of these groups and in particular their skills at working with the media and providing highly professional 'soundbites' more or less on cue make them an invaluable resource to media machinery working to tight schedules and with increasingly small budgets. They allow the media to be seen to be doing their duty by providing 'balance' in their reporting. At the same time, they show how 'folk devils' can and do 'fight back'. This phenomenon of becoming an expert, having been a deviant, has a long history in the field of serious crime, drug abuse andjuvenile delinquency. However, the proliferation of groups recently set up to campaign on behalf or with folk devils and the skill with which they engage with media is an extremely important development in political culture. When Labour and Conservatives take the same line on law and order, arguing for 'effective punishment' and the need for the tnoral regeneration of society, many media are inclined to give voice to other, sometimes dissenting, groups. In the absence of an immediate and articulate response from Labour, such groups occasionally function as a virtual form of opposition to the government. A new political sociology, taking into account the prominence of the media, might fruitfully explore the precise sphere of influence and the effectiveness of these organizations.
This marks a series of developments which have occurred perhaps in response to the impact of moral panic theory itself,4 i.e. the sociologist as expert. At least some of the agents of social control must Rethinking 'moralpanic'for multi-mediated soczal worlds 567 have been listening when figures like Jock Young and Geoff Pearson were invited to add their voices to these debates, because in recent incidents where there have been fears that disorder or olltbreaks of rioting might spread to other areas or to other cities, the playing down of the scale of such incidents has been a recurrent feature and a point of recommendation by the police in relation to the media.
Although moral panics are anti-intellectual, often characterized by a certain religious fervour, and historically most effectively used by the right, only a predominantly right-wing national press arguably stops them from being amenable to the current left. Of course, government is always advantaged, due to higher number of authoritative news sources and to institutionalized agenda-setting. But, there is always the possibility of backfire. For example, when John Major attempted to build upon the moral panic around 'single mothers' (if not initiated, then certainly fueled by government spokespeople because it helped legitimize welfare cutbacks) with his 'Back to Basics' campaign, the media, followed by Labour, deflected the empty rhetoric back onto the Tory party, turning the campaign into an ad-hoc investigation into the personal morality and sexual practices of Tory MPs.
The delicate balance of relations which the moral panic sociologists saw existing between media, agents of social control, folk devils and moral guardians, has given way to a much more complicated and fragmented set of connections. Each of the categories described by moral panics theorists has undergone a process of fissure in the intervening years. New liaisons have been developed and new initiatives pursued. In particular, two groups seem to be making ever more vocal and 'effective' intervention: pressure groups have, among other things, strongly contested the vocality of the traditional moral guardians; and commercial interests have planted the seeds, and courted discourses, of moral panic in seeking to gain the favourable attention of youthful consumers. This leads us to query the usefulness of the term 'moral panic' -a metaphor which depicts a complex society as a single person who experiences sudden fear about its virtue. The term's anthropomorphism and totalization arguably mystify more than they reveal. Its conception of morals overlooks the youthful ethics of abandon and the moral imperatives of pressure groups and vocal experts. In the l990s, we need to acknowledge the perspectives and articulations of different sectors of society. New sociologies of social regulation need to shift attention away from the conventional points in the circuit of amplification and control and look instead to these other spaces.
MORAL PANICS FOR EVERY MEDIUM
Not only need the attitudes and activities of different social groups and organizations be taken into account and not subsumed under a 568 Angela McRobbie anzl Sarah L. Thornton consensual 'society', but also the disparate perspectives of different mass, niche and micro-media need to be explored. Britain saw a remarkable 73 per cent increase in consumer magazine titles during the 1 980s -the result of more detailed market research, tighter target marketing and new technologies like computer mailing and desk-top publishing (Marketing 13 August 1993). Crucially, the success of many of these magazines has been in the discovery and effective representation of niches of opinion and identity. As seen above, moral panic is a favourite topic of the youth press. When the mass media of tabloids and TV become active in the 'inevitable' moral panic about 'Acid House', the subsultural press were ready. They tracked the tabloids every move, re-printed whole front pages, analysed their copy and decried the mzsrepresentation of Acid House. Some 30 magazines now target and speak up for youth.
Another area of development is the gay and lesbian press who are represented by several national and regional, weekly and monthly papers, magazines and free sheets, some of which have become sub-divided by age, like the long-established Gay News which takes a different editorial line from the younger, less political Boyz. Of course, these developments are very much dependent on the development of a 'pink economy' and the commercial recognition of the presence and persistence of high levels of gay discretionary income.
Despite their proliferation and diversification, however, the media are obviously not a positive reflection of the diversity of Britain's social interests. This is partly because there are large groups of people in which the media are not economically, and, therefore, editorially interested -crucially, the D and E 'social grades' which are categorized by the National Readership Survey as the unskilled working class and 'those at the lowest levels of subsistence', in other words, the long-term employed and poorly pensioned. But even here, there are glimmers of hope. The Big Issue is now perceived as the newspaper voice of the homeless. Other groups and agencies produce a never-ending flow of newsletters and press releases many of which are written in a house-style customized to the needs of the journalists on national and local media. So-called folk devils now produce their own media as a counter to what they perceive as the biased media of the mainstream.
Moreover, these niche and micro-media can even attempt to incite their own moral panics. Take, for example, two rival political groups, the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and the British National Party (BNP) -both of which have their own tabloid papers, which speak to their members and attempt to reach out beyond. In the wake of the election of a BNP councillor in Tower Hamlets in autumn 1993, the fascist BNP paper wrote hysterically about the lost neighbourhoods of the white working class and vilified members of the Anti-Nazi League (ANL, a branch of the SWP) as 'ANAL' scum. The SWP paper, on the other hand, recounted how fascism was sweeping the country and Rethinking 'moralpanic'formulti-mediated social worlds 1993) . Given the more measured copy which follows, the Guurdzan would seem to be using this 'shock horror' language to lighten up the story-the capital letters signifying an ironic borrowing of tabloid style. But, as the Sun's language is understood by many of its readers as tongue-in-cheek, the Guardzan's irony gives it an alibi, but not absolution. Moreover, these mixtures of outrage and amusement point to the 'entertainment value' of moral panics -something mentioned but not really integrated into previous models. (cf. Curran and Sparks 1991 for a critique of the sastigmatic perspective' of accounts of politics and the press which overlook entertainment.)
In considering the Daily Mail, the Sun and the Guardzan, we've found that each paper has its own style of in-house moralism. As the British press becomes more competitive, one strategy for maintaining healthy circulation figures is for a newspaper to cast itself in the role of moral guardian, ever alert to new possibilities for concern and indignation. It would seem that professional journalistic style, carefully attuned to the popularity of 'human interest' stories, draws on a moralistic voice which, for the purposes of variety, it is willing to undercut with occasional irony, jokes, etc.
Although the multiplicity of contemporary moral panics is perhaps best demonstrated in relation to print media, the same tendencies can be found in radio and television. Even with only four terrestrial channels, new definitions of youth programming have opened a space for counter-discourses. Television producer Janet Street-Porter, drawing on the cut-up graphic style of punk and indicating a new commitment on the part of broadcasters to take youth seriously, pioneered 'Youth TV' in the mid-eighties through her Def II series on BBC2. In keeping with this commitment several of these programmes were explicitly aimed at countering youthful folk devils and moral panics, particularly around drugs. Thus an informative and rational BBC2 Reportage programme on the use of Ecstasy in rave culture can be set against the much more traditional sensational and fearful Cook Report (ITV) on the same subject ( 1992).
MEDIATED SOCIAL WORLDS
In addition to unpacking 'society', on the one hand, and the 'media', on the other, the third consideration in updating models of 'moral panic' need be that the media is no longer something separable from society. Social reality is experienced through language, communication and imagery. Social meanings and social differences are inextricably tied up with representation. Thus when sociologists call for an account which tells how life actually is, and which deals with the
